Issues of External Funding and the Viability of Rural Development Banks by Bourne, Compton
·.• 
' 
• 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper #814 
Issues of External Funding And The 
Viability of Rural Development Banks 
by 
Compton Bourne 
University of the West Indies 
Paper Prepared for 
The Caribbean Agricultural Training Committee (CACTCOM) · 
Senior Management Workshop 
Georgetown, Guyana 
November 17-20, 1980 
FEB 1 198~ 
ISSUES OF EXTERNAL FUNDING AND THE VIABILITY 
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS* 
Governments of many less developed countries have established 
rural financial agencies as important instruments for rapid agricultural 
development.· This paper examines some "funding problems" experienced 
by these rural development banks. It is argued that the credit 
operations and long run viability of rural development banks are affected 
by the sources of loanable funds. The basic funding problem confronting 
these institutions is to secure that volume and composition of loanable 
funds consistent with efficient credit operations and sustained growth 
of the financial institutions. 
The rural finance literature, surveyed by Adams (1977), Lele 
(1974), and Lipton (1976), has devoted a great deal of attention to 
problems of credit disbursement, pricing and loan recovery. A consensus 
has emerged that distributional equity is not achieved by concessionally 
priced credit programs, that allocative inefficiencies result from 
interest rate subsidies, and that the financial viability of credit 
institutions is undermined by low nominal loan rates of interest, high 
lending costs, and by high rates of default, particularly among large 
farm borrowers. These conclusions have been derived from analyses of 
the assets of credit institutions. 
* This paper draws heavily on my paper, "Funding Viability of Rural 
Development Banks" co-authored with Douglas H. Graham, and on my 
study of Public Development Financial Enterprises: A Case Study of 
the Jamaica Development Bank. 
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It is doubtful, however, that the performance of rural credit 
institutions and their viability can be divorced from considerations 
of their funding. The study of the liabilities or the inflows can 
improve our understanding of the credit operations of rural development 
banks, as well as identify additional factors germane to the sustained 
growth of rural financial markets. Such an analysis is the subject 
matter of this paper which is divided into five sections. The first 
section describes the main sources of funding, while the second and 
third sections examine the short term implications of external funding. 
The fourth section deals with the effect of institutional malperformance 
on future public external funding. The fifth section examines three 
ways of optimizing funding arrangements. 
Empirical reference is made to the Jamaican Development Bank, a 
governmental credit institution established in 1969, largely at the 
initiative of the World Bank, for the purpose of extending development 
loans. Since development banks in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries 
have similar origins, funding patterns and operational features, more 
than a few of the conclusions derived here have wider applicability. 
Conventional Sources of Funds: The JDB Case 
Public sector rural development banks conventionally have two 
major sources of funds, namely foreign funds and domestic budgetary 
contributions. Foreign funds are occasionally grants, but more 
usually loans by foreign governments and by multilateral agencies. 
The governments of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
West Germany have made important contributions to the financing of 
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agricultural development through the medium of rural development banks 
in low income countries. Multilateral development agencies, particularly 
the World Bank, and regional development banks such as the Inter-
American Development Bank have made sizeable loans to public and private 
development finance institutions serving rural communities in developing 
countries. 
Table 1 describes the composition of the total annual inflows of 
financial resources into the Jamaica Development Bank from 1970 to 1977. 
Foreign sources accounted for 24 percent of these flows. Three external 
agencies accounted for the bulk of these foreign funds. The Inter-
American Development Bank was the major single foreign source providing 
some 40 percent of foreign financial resources, followed by the World 
Bank with 25 percent, and the Caribbean Development Bank with 20 percent. 
Jamaica Government loans and capital subsc~iptions accounted for 
52 percent of total inflows. From 1974 onwards, most of these financial 
transfers were in the form of equity. Loans from local banks accounted 
for only six percent of total resource inflows. Repayments of loans by 
Jamaica Development Bank borrowers accounted for as little as four 
percent. It is evident, therefore, that for the period as a whole, 
external agencies and the Jamaican Government were the main sources from 
which the Jamaica Development Bank received its funds and that repayment 
inflows have been insignificant. The percentage contributions of the 
individual sources of financing varied over time. For all years, 
however, Jamaican Government contributions and foreign receipts were 
the largest elements. 
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TABLE 1 
Major Sources of Funds for the Jamaica 
Development Bank 1970-1977 
Sources 
J$ Million 
43.4 
Government 96.5 
Government Agencies 6.6 
% 
23.6 
52.4 
3.6 
Local Connnercial Banks 11.1 6.0 
Repayments 6.6 3.6 
Miscellaneous* 19.9 10.8 
TOTAL 184.1 100.0 
Source: Compiled from sources and uses tables and balance sheet 
statements in annual reports of the Jamaica Development 
Bank. 
*NOTE: Decrease in bank balances and cash balances comprised 
19 percent in 1972 and 26 percent in 1973. Decreases in 
investment in subsidiaries comprised 16 percent in 1974. 
These sources account for the large percentage share of 
"miscellaneous" over the period. 
I ~ 
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Similarly detailed information is not available for the agricultural 
sector portfolio specifically. However, the data obtained from the 
Bank's Annual Reports reveal that foreign funds comprised between 
35 percent and 67 percent of the total agricultural loan portfolio. 
The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Caribbean Development Bank have supported the agricultural loan 
portfolio. 
Implications of External Funding for Lender Behaviour 
The sources and terms of obtaining financial resources can have 
a strong influence on credit policies and operational efficiency of 
banks. Donors (and local governments for that matter) often try to 
influence the behaviour of credit institutions in ways that can affect 
their viability. Funds obtained from foreign private financial 
institutions can also have behavioral implications for rural banks. 
One important restriction by external donors is the 
specification of target groups and enterprises to be serviced by the 
banks. External funding agencies, while not generally stipulating the 
size and wealth characteristics of eligible farms, usually recommend 
types of enterprises that should receive favourable treatment. This 
kind of recommendation stems from their views about the catalytic 
roles of particular types of agricultural activity and about the 
suitability of these activities as instruments for technological 
progress, improved nutritional levels, and expanded rural employment. 
The rural credit agencies and their governments, generally incorporate 
these recommendations in their loan programs. This may be due to the 
fact that they share the developmental philosophy of donors or know 
' 
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they can circumvent the restrictions, and for other reasons such as their 
own limited knowledge and experience in agricultural development and 
financial planning, their anxiety to obtain funding, and their perception 
of little negotiating space. The identification of target groups, 
emphasizing the adoption of modern technology, frequently results in 
loan portfolios biased towards labor-displacing imported capital goods, 
and towards larger farmers. These biases negate the employment and 
equity objectives articulated by both local governments and donors. 
Following President McNamara's address to the Annual Meeting of 
the World Bank in Nairobi in 1973, official funding sources have sought 
to directly tackle the equity problem by devising small farm credit 
programs and preferential schemes. Potential political gains from 
small farm programs give governments another reason for promoting these 
types of programs. In practice, concessionary interest rate policies 
combined with the high unit costs of small farmer loan programs cause 
development banks to favour large farmers. Socio-political realities 
of rural connnunities and bureaucratic inertia frequently reinforce 
this tendency (Lipton, Blair). However, the main point is that the 
banks may be influenced by their funding agencies into servicing 
particular target groups which may not match their own loan management 
capabilities. 
Another type of restriction concerns short period production 
loans. It has not been unusual for external donors to prohibit the 
financing of working capital requirements out of project funds. For 
instance, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank 
' 
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contracts with the Jamaica Development Bank contain such provisions. 
Underlying this kind of stipulation may be the belief that investment 
capital requirements should be accorded priority, that the private 
financial system can or should satisfy demands for working capital loans, 
or that the credit agency should fund its working capital loans from 
other sources. There are signs that the position of external creditors 
on working capital loans has become less rigid, as the following 
excerpt makes clear: 
"In the initial stages of the transition to a more 
productive agriculture, access to short-term credit 
for purchasing fertilizer, improved seeds, pesticides, 
etc .. , is often of greater importance for small farmers 
than long-term credit. Accordingly, in the credit 
programs for small farmers, emphasis will be placed 
on short-term seasonal credit in the context of overall 
on-farm development planning. World Bank lending 
could provide a permanent working capital fund for 
this purpose which is rolled over and re-used from 
year to year. As the Bank loan or IDA credit is 
repaid, domestic sources of credit and capital can 
gradually replace external funds." 
(World Bank, p. 19). 
Following upon Adam's work (1971), the influence of external 
donors on interest rate policies has been more widely recognized. 
Recent events in Jamaica give support to findinRs in other countries. 
Foreign agencies provide funds at concessionary rates of interest and 
require the Jamaica Development Bank to onlend at concessional nominal 
loan rates which in real terms are either substantially negative, or 
close to zero when positive. Concessionary interest rate policies 
result in high loan administration costs and a bias towards large 
farmers. This worsens income distribution and undermines institutional 
viability. There is no doubt that external donors are aware of the 
' 
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limitations of concessionary rates of interest for the financial sector, 
the rural economy, and for general ~conomic development. The World 
Bank (1975, pp. 12-13) has discussed factors such as resource 
misallocation, wealth gains by larger farmers, losses incurred by 
lenders, and political corruption and abuse. At the same time, local 
governments perceive certain advantages in concessionary loan rates, 
using them to partially correct for the adverse terms of trade between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy, as hidden subsidies, and as 
convenient means of political patronage and manipulation. Consequently, 
while piecemeal and gradual interest rate reform is occurring in a few 
countries, progress towards interest rate policies that reflect the 
scarcity value of capital and the costs of funds tends to be slow. 
Restrictions on lender behaviour are also associated with the 
foreign currency debts incurred by rural banks in their acquisition 
of foreign funds for onlending locally. The banks are usually required 
to repay their foreign debts in the currencies in which the debts 
are denominated. Since devaluation of the local currency will 
automatically increase the local currency value of debts denominated 
in foreign currency, foreign exchange risks are associated with the 
foreign currency debts of rural banks. Local governments sometimes 
assume these foreign exchange risks. However, it is not uncommon for 
external donors to stipulate that the sub-borrowers (i.e., rural bank 
customers) bear the foreign exchange costs associated with their loans, 
i.e., incur the additional local currency costs growing out of any 
future devaluations. 
' 
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A few other short run aspects of the type of funding arrangements 
described in the previous section also merit discussion. To the extent 
that cormnercial credits to rural banks tend to be of short maturities, 
rural development banks may be predisposed to lend for quick gestation 
projects. The fact that this tendency counterbalances the bias towards 
long term loans created by external funds emphasizes the importance of 
harmonizing the sources and uses of funds and the desired loan operations 
of rural banks. 
Further, unless there is a large rollover or debt rescheduling, the 
short maturities of their debt places considerable demands on annual 
inflows of new funds. Debt service and amortization consume large 
proportions of new resources thereby reducing that which is available 
for new lending to farmers. Between 1971 and 1977, total debt service 
and amortization payments by the Jamaica Development Bank averaged 
20 percent of its annual available resources. 
Another aspect of external funding pertains to the negative 
influence of a too rapid disbursement of funds on the quality of the 
loan portfolio. Both local governments and foreign agencies inject large 
amounts of financial resources into rural banks in the early stages of their 
operations, usually before well-functioning loan appraisal and monitoring 
systems are organized and staffed. Rapid growth of loan approvals and 
disbursements seriously burden these weak loan management systems and 
result in poor loan quality and high arrears ratios. These problems are 
compounded wheR funding agencies measure the performance of rural banks 
by the growth of their loan disbursements. Frequently, this is the only 
performance measure used in the early years when few loans fall due and 
' 
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incipient arrears problems go undetected. In these circumstances, the 
banks themselves may yield to the pressure to approve and disburse as 
many loans as possible, sacrificing efficiency and loan quality in the 
process. 
Implications for Loan Portfolio Performance 
I have argued that external funding agencies influence the credit 
operations of rural banks. By so doing, they contribute to the loan 
repayment problems experienced by these banks. The analysis of the 
latter proposition will center on the possible implications of lender 
preferences for particular enterprises and inputs, the non-provision of 
working capital loans, and the policy on foreign exchange costs. 
Debt financed expansion of farm enterprises increases the borrower's 
financial risks. Furthermore, farm liquidity is reduced by the act of 
borrowing itself. Some degree of self-financing is generally associated 
with debt-financed capital formation. Counterpart requirements imposed 
by lenders usually ensure that some of the farmer's own resources 
complement loan funds. In this way, some or all of the farmer's actual 
liquidity might be absorbed. Also, depending on the degree to which farm 
enterprises utilize their existing assets as loan collateral, there is a 
corresponding reduction of unutilized borrowing capacity or potential 
liquidity. The seriousness of the loss of potential liquidity is of course 
moderated by the degree to which farm enterprises can obtain unsecured 
credit. They often manage to do so but only in small amounts and at high 
cost from the informal rural credit markets. Paradoxically, liquidity is 
often scarcest during the period of greater financial risk when more 
liquidity is needed • 
• 
-11-
Farmers traditionally attempt to reduce financial risk by 
diversifying their output in order to stabilize gross income flows. The 
scope for stabilizing net income flows is greater to the degree that input 
use is sufficiently flexible to permit downward adjustment when warranted 
by product demand conditions and relative factor prices. Lender 
restrictions and preferences reduce the scope for these forms of risk 
minimization. 
Lender preferences for particular types of enterprises will usually 
alter tht~ optimal product mix of farm debtors (Hopkins, Barry, Baker, 
Ch. 8), by altering tbl:' effective rates of return on output. The possible 
outcome of stipulations concerning specific product types and pure stand 
cultivation is a lower level of product diversification, particularly 
with respect to those short-term cash crops which would not only 
create a greater degree of flexibility in product choice, but would 
also help t~1 boost farm incomes in the early stages of the longer 
gestation projects wlaich rural banks prefer. The technological bias 
implies that farmers adopting the lender-preferred technique of production 
might be locked into a situation where reductions in the utilization of 
capital goods cannot be efficiently made, and in which there is limited 
scope for substituting a cheaper factor, e.g., family labour, for more 
expensive capital services. Consequently there may be an increase in 
their vulnerability to falling product prices and to rising costs of 
capital services (especially important under conditions of exchange rate 
depreciation). Any pressure on net farm income might well put pressure on 
debt-servicing capacity and result in loan delinquency • 
' 
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A farm enterprise can attempt to moderate temporary debt service 
difficulties by reducing its average propensity to consume, or more likely 
by attempting to obtain short-term credit. However, as we have argued 
earlier, rural development banks are not usually a source of short-term 
credit. Nor are such resources readily forthcoming from connnercial 
banks that are the predominant mobilizers of local financial savings and 
the principal short-term lenders. Commercial banks in lesser developed 
countries employ quite restrictive credit criteria and portfolio 
preferences. These exclude most potential agricultural borrowers. 
Selective loan guarantee and rediscount schemes have not been successful 
in encouraging a greater volume of commercial bank credit to agriculture, 
since attempts to collect on defaulted or delinquent loans that are guaranteed 
involve expensive and time consuming legal procedures. A case can be 
made, therefore, for rural development banks to directly provide production 
loans. Where external funding agencies preclude the use of their project 
funds for working capital loans, the rural banks can nonetheless attempt 
to fill this credit gap by mobilizing local resources either by borrowing 
from the private financial sector or by directly providing a deposit 
service. 
We turn now to the implications of the policy on foreign exchange 
costs. This centers around the question of who should bear the risk and the 
additional unpredictable rise in loan costs associated with fixed foreign 
currency obligations when there is a devaluation of the local currency. 
Raghavan (1980) has suggested several broad guidelines for allocating 
foreign exchange risk. He argues that the borrowing enterprise should be 
' 
' 
' 
• 
-13-
required to bear the risk if it derives a scarcity value from imported 
producer goods or if interest rates are concessionary. However, since the 
foreign exchange proceeds of the loans confer a social benefit by adding 
to the import capacity of the economy as a whole, the foreign exchange 
cost should not be entirely allocated to the borrowing enterprise. 
Essentially, these costs if borne by the farmer can be .incorporated 
·into the interest rate variable. An increase in foreign exchange costs 
reduces farm capital growth by reducing the net rate of return. The 
foreign exchange costs implied by the stipulations on exchange risk are 
uncertain in nature but do assume serious proportions in countries 
experiencing large and repetitive exchange rate devaluations. These costs 
are not easily absorbed by farmers under conditions of weak product markets. 
Donor agencies have argued that with devaluation-induced increases 
in domestic farm product prices and with improved international price 
competitiveness, domestic sub-borrowers should be net gainers from 
repetitive devaluations and should therefore experience no great difficulty 
in repaying loans with the added devaluation costs. However, devaluation-
induced increases in factor costs and the continuing price control policies 
for farm products erode these potential gains. As a result, the conditions 
assumed to be operative by donors are not readily satisfied at least in 
the short run. Severe debt repayment problems are more likely to result 
because of the abruptness of the exchange rate adjustment which raises 
debt costs immediately whereas the income affects of attempts to phase out 
price conrrols takes much longer. Some reconsideration of this policy seems 
warranted. It seems reasonable to assume that the rural banks, by virtue 
of the larger scale of their operations and by the adoption of loan 
pricing policies which include a small premium for exchange risk, can 
' 
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better hedge against foreign exchange risks associated with foreign currency 
debt. It can also be argued that since exchange devaluation is the outcome 
of gtneralised economic disequilibria and is not attributable specifically 
to rural borrowers, that society as a whole should bear the costs. In 
such a case, government should accept the foreign exchange risks. 
Another consequence of the foreign exchange stipulation under conditions 
of currency depreciation is an increase in the rural bank's risk exposure. 
The upward readjustment of the current local currency value of a loan is 
unaccompanied by a similar revision of pledged collateral. This implies 
that the existing collateral covers a smaller proportion of current loan 
value than the bank regards as prudent. In effect, the banks' risk exposure 
increases. 
Feedback Effects on Public External Funding 
Paradoxically, the financial problems which ensue from donor influences 
on rural banking might create problems of future external funding. The 
flow of funds from the donors might decline in response to one or more 
factors. Funding agencies as a matter of policy may wish to prevent 
continued reliance on their resources. More importantly, the arrears 
problem, typically disguised in the earlier years by extensive grace 
periods, becomes clearer as more loans fall due. This may result in the 
suspension of disbursements on existing loan contracts and a refusal to 
replenish resources by new contracts unless institutional reforms occur. 
The prospects for reform, of course, are conditional upon debt recovery and, 
at the same time, by the overall economic environment affecting the 
prospects for economic recovery, the restructuring of interest rates and 
the political environment influencing the prospects for foreclosures on 
collateral. Another possibility is that drastic shifts in the economic 
' 
' 
• 
-15-
position of governments of developing countries may induce a slowing down 
of disbursements and other financial sanctions by the donor agencies. In 
practice it is the first two which seem to be responsible for the decline 
in foreign resource flows to rural development banks in less developed 
countries. 
Possible Means of Resolving Funding Problems 
It has been contended that public external funding may seriously 
constrain the allocative and operational efficiency of rural development 
banks. One solution to this problem is to attempt to alter the operational 
criteria and loan preferences of the funding agencies themselves. Another 
solution is to develop new sources of funding that are not subject to the 
same limitations. The latter solution is analyzed in this section. Three 
methods of developing new sources of funds are examined, namely, deposits, 
bond issues, and earmarked taxes. 
Public sector development banks do not usually accept deposits from 
the public. Nonetheless, there are potentially important gains to be 
derived from providing deposit facilities. The provision of these 
facilities removes a peculiar constricting feature of this type of 
financial institution, namely, that their credit operations and debt 
repayments do not themselves provide a steady return flow of funds to 
the banks as deposits. This is quite unlike the case of deposit-taking 
institutions, e.g., commercial banks, where expended credit balances and 
deposit withdrawals return partially at least to the financial institutions 
in the form of new deposits thereby ensuring no full and permanent leakage 
of loanable resources from the financial institutions. For rural 
development banks, which do not have deposit facilities, the leakage is both 
' 
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full and permanent. Furthermore, deposits constitute a more general and 
diversified source of loanable funds. There is accordingly a greater degree 
of freedom from portfolio restrictions and control by funding entities. 
Additionally, the fact that the continued ability of a bank to attract 
deposits depends on potential depositors' confidence in the banks' 
financial management forces greater adherence to financial discipline. 
This can result in more efficient loan appraisal and more effective loan 
collections. Finally, where loan customers are also depositors, rural 
development banks have a potentially greater informational basis for 
monitoring the financial performance of their debtors. 
In retrospect, it would appear more promising to incorporate a 
development bank portfolio within a well established commercial banking 
institution rather than the other way around. This would ensure financial 
discipline and effective monitoring of the portfolio from the very 
beginning. This latter point illustrates one of the most promising 
opportunities lost by donors and LDC's in the 1970s, namely, the 
incorporation of a small but viable and slowly growing long run development 
portfolio within a nationalized commercial banking network. Instead, 
donors and LDCs moved headlong into promoting separate limited service 
development banks which were ill-prepared to design, evaluate, disburse and 
monitor their loan portfolio with the insight, discipline and caution that 
a well trained and experienced commercial banking staff could have 
brought to the task. 
Local and foreign bond issues are another mechanism for raising 
resources. Some external funding agencies such as the World Bank 
certainly see this option as a preferred one for national and regional 
development banks attempting to reduce their reliance on multilateral 
concessional funding. Both means of financing impose some degree of market 
' 
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discipline on rural banks. The difficulties of international bond issues 
are well known. They include: (1) legal and other institutional barriers 
to entry into developed countries' capital markets; (2) the inability of 
lesser developed countries to satisfy the informational requirements 
for bond placements; (3) quantitative limits on foreign country issues in 
the domestic capital markets of the developed countries; and (4) discriminatory 
taxation of interest income derived for foreign bondholdings. Efforts at 
improving developing countries' access to capital markets in developed 
countries are currently being made at the international level (Development 
Committee, 1978). At the present time, however, one cannot hold out much 
hope for substantial foreign bond financing of national development 
banks. 
Domestic bond issues are also subject to difficulties, low levels of 
private wealth, rudimentary capital markets, and financial risk aversion 
among households and corporations are characteristic of underdeveloped 
financial structures. Each constitutes a major barrier to successful bond 
issues. Private financial institutions which command most domestic 
financial savings tend to confine their equity investment to short-term 
and long-term government securities. Therefore, greater access to their 
resources can only arise through competition with central government 
financing or from policy measures that explicitly favour acquisition of 
development bank bonds. The Jamaican experience reveals that short-term 
budgetary requirements of the government may prevail over the financing 
requirements of public sector development banks. However, this need not 
be the case, and development banks may prove capable of bidding away 
financial resources from the recurrent budget. 
' 
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Proposals are sometimes made to compel private financial 
institutions to acquire development bonds. Among the devices proposed 
are earmarking part of the proceeds of central bank legal requirements, 
and the imposition of legal requirements that private financial institutions 
invest directly a portion of their assets in development bank bonds. While 
providing for automatic growth of resources, these devices reduce financial 
discipline in rural credit institutions, and may reduce the overall 
efficiency of financial resource use. 
An issue of optimal timing arises with respect to both deposit 
mobilization and bond issues by rural development banks. The ability of 
the banks to attract funds through either mechanism depends on the state of 
their financial portfolios. The tendency of rural development banks to 
experience serious arrears and liquidity problems implies that public issues 
of bonds or deposit acceptance are not likely to be particularly successful 
if they are attempted after the institutions' public image is one of 
financial mismanagement and near bankruptcy. In effect, a case can be made 
for the early adoption of these two financial mechanisms given the difficulty 
of doing so later, and the role they can play in instilling financial 
discipline at a crucial early stage of the institutional life cycle. As 
mentioned earlier, the issue of optimal timing for creating a stronger 
liability base can also be tied in with the issue of the optimal 
institutional method of incorporating a development portfolio in the young 
and imperfectly developed capital markets of LDCs. Building this portfolio 
within the institutional setting of a nationalized commercial bank may 
prove to be a more viable and self-sustaining institutional vehicle for 
promoting the growth of development financing in many LDCs. 
.. 
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At the level of governmental budgetary support, taxes can be 
earmarked for contribution to the rural development bank. This would 
essentially result in linking the growth of budgetary resources to the 
growth of fiscal revenues. However, like other forms of government 
budgetary support, it may result in political interference with credit 
allocation and loan collection operations, and in financial laxity. 
Conclusions 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. 
First, public sector rural development banks are heavily dependent on 
local governments and external agencies for their funding. Local private 
sector financial institutions and loan recoveries within the rural banks 
themselves are not significant sources of loanable funds. Second, the 
influence exerted by public external funding on the lending practices of 
rural banks may contribute to the weakening of loan portfolio performance 
and overall financial viability of these banks. Third, none of the 
resultant portfolio decisions are necessarily consistent with allocative 
efficiency, distributional equity, or higher levels of rural employment. 
Fourth, the possibility that public external funds may contract as a 
result of those financial problems themselves threatens the long-run 
viability and growth of these banks. 
These short and long period implications lead to the overriding 
conclusion that the sources of funding should be broadened to include less 
restrictive and more dynamic resource inflows. Three extensions, namely, 
deposit mobilization, bond issues, and earmarked taxes were examined 
briefly. Deposit mobilization and local bond issues are preferable and 
... 
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are also potentially more successful methods of funding, provided they are 
initiated at a relatively early stage in a rural development bank's life-
cycle. 
However, once the banks have evolved into the classic resource 
crises discussed in this paper, the policy space for effective 
restructuring of resource inflows will have been severly reduced. In 
this case, no formula for reform and survival is easy to devise. 
Liability structures appropriately designed from the outset may prevent 
or moderate many of the short and long run problems typically 
experienced by rural development banks . 
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